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The popular press often portrays environ-
mental health risks as scarier than most sci-
entists would portray them. The press tends
to present these risks from the general pub-
lic's perspective. This paper describes a
widely used approach to understanding
how the views of scientists and the public
differ and gives an example ofhow the gap
between these views can be bridged.
Because the media's presentation of envi-
ronmental health issues is key in establish-
ing the terms ofpublic discourse, such an
approach can further fruitful dialogue in
the policymaking process.
The task is to help define a research
agenda for protecting children-and thus
all of us-from environmental health haz-
ards. Because this agenda will ultimately be
some combination ofthe ideas put forward
by scientists, public health officials, and the
public, the role of the media is critical in
this policy-development process. Reporters
are the link between scientists and the
public. This paper provides a framework for
understanding the ways in which scientists
and the public view and define risk. How
we all perceive risks is key to decisionmak-
ing about the investment ofresearch funds.
Newspapers and magazines, television
and radio, and on-line news services and
bulletin boards report to us daily about
conflicting views between scientists and the
public. An example is the series ofexperi-
ments using radiation that were carried out
by various government agencies during the
Cold War and announced by Department
of Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary in
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December 1993. While Secretary O'Leary
expressed grave concern about informed
consent procedures and the nature ofsome
of the work, many scientists stepped for-
ward to give assessments ofthe risks ofcer-
tain of the procedures, such as radioactive
tracers, that were intended to counter the
public's more worried assessment. Those of
us in scientific institutions usually feel that
reporters-and certainly writers of head-
lines and television news "teasers"-give
prominence to the public's views and fears,
or elements that play on those fears (1). A
few headlines from California news stories
illustrate this:
Town where cancer lives
Killing fields
Still clueless after all these years - state
survey reveals little about 'mystery
disease'
Town with a hex on it
Poison underfoot
The mystery disease - strange parasite
breeds nightmares for families
Why don't scientists and the public
think alike about environmental hazards?
Drawing on the work ofBaruch Fischhoff,
Paul Slovic, and other social scientists,
Peter Sandman (2,3) developed a helpful
formulation for us that says when scientists
calculate environmental health risks, they
take four steps: they evaluate a substance's
toxicity, they assess the exposure to people,
they estimate the likelihood of harmful
health effects, and they arrive at a level of
hazard. Their equation according to
Sandman looks like this:
RISK = HAZARD
Most of us-and this seems especially
true ofscientists-believe that reasonable
people would agree with that "hazard" con-
clusion ifthey were given the information
that led to it. We believe that information
leads to understanding, acceptance, and
appropriate action. Scientists and policy
makers often view the public as alarmingly
irrational when the public does not agree
with their conclusions, and even as will-
fully ignorant when they refuse to listen
when scientists try to explain themselves.
Obviously something is missing from the
scientists' risk formula. What is left out are
the more qualitative aspects of risk: values,
emotions, power relations, and the need
for action. Sandman developed this alter-
native risk equation (3):
RISK = HAZARD + OUTRAGE
The "outrage factors" make up the aspects
of risk that scientists tend to ignore or fail
to acknowledge. Outrage factors are key
components ofrisk; they are quite real-as
real as the scientists' hazard component-
and not at all irrational. Social scientist
Deborah Tannen has described similar fail-
ures to communicate in her book, YouJust
Don't Understand (4), in which she details
the often-differing premises on which men
and women base their actions and
responses. Neither view is inherently
wrong or irrational; they are simply differ-
ent. She also notes the value ofbeing able
to speak from both perspectives. Ten ofthe
outrage factors that most often arise in
environmental health are listed below.
Factors that
decrease risk
Voluntary
Control
Fair
Ordinary
Not dreaded
Natural
Certain
Familiar
Factors that
increase risk
Imposed
Lack ofcontrol
Unfair
Memorable
Dreaded
Technological,
artificial
Uncertain
Unfamiliar
Morally acceptable Morally unacceptable
Trustworthy source Untrustworthy source
Environmental Health Perspectives 123E. R. BLAKE
These factors influence events in differ-
entways.
* Voluntary/imposed. People need and
value choice. When we choose to take a
risk, we do not get upset. Think about
skiers, football players, motorcyclists
who shun helmets, and smokers; volun-
tarily taking a risk is, for some of us,
part ofthe fun. If, on the other hand,
choice is taken away, we may get angry.
* Control/lack ofcontrol. We all feel bet-
ter when we are in control, especially in
a risky situation. Most of us prefer to
be the driver ofa car than a passenger,
especially ifwe have concerns about the
other person's driving skills.
* Fair/unfair. Are the risks and benefits of
the hazard equally distributed? Who is
getting the benefits from the hazard,
and who is bearing the risk? (This fac-
tor is key to the concerns ofthe envi-
ronmentaljustice movement.)
* Ordinary/memorable. Nuclear radia-
tion hazards, for example, are associated
with the very memorable atomic bomb.
* Not dreaded/dreaded. Some health
problems are more dreaded than others.
Cancer and birth defects, for example,
are more dreaded than other disabling
and even fatal conditions such as
emphysema.
* Natural/technological or artificial (cre-
ated by people). Public health officials
have been largely unsuccessful in raising
concern about radon, whereas identical
exposures from uranium mine tailings
have caused major community protests.
* Certainty/uncertainty. Uncertainty
about who is at risk-is your child the
"one in a million" who will get cancer
from the proposed waste incinerator?-
and disagreement among experts about
the level of hazard illustrate ways in
which uncertainty increases risk.
* Familiar/unfamiliar. A cartoonist cap-
tured this outrage factor in a cartoon
(5). In this cartoon, a man answers a
knock at the door ofhis house to find a
person on the step in a protective
"moonsuit." The visitor is saying, "I'm
from the Hazardous Wastes Agency,
and I have something to tell you about
your lawn." Many hazardous materials
agencies that plan to take samples near
residences now bring moonsuits into
schools and neighborhoods for people
to see beforehand, so that they do not
become frightened and gain a height-
ened sense ofrisk when they later see
the sampling being done.
* Morally acceptable/unacceptable. We
have come a long way from the days
when wastes were acceptably tossed
wholesale into our streets and water-
ways. Today, pollution is almost a dirty
word; a spokesperson who talked of
"acceptable levels of contamination"
would last about as long on a public
podium as a police chiefwho spoke of
"acceptable levels ofcrime."
* Trustworthy/untrustworthy. I have
saved a most important outrage factor
for last: it is the trustworthiness ofthe
information source. People and organi-
zations perceived as benefiting from a
hazard, or as having not told the truth
about it, are not readily trusted. During
the controversy several years ago over
the pesticide Alar, the manufacturer
and the apple growers associations had
low credibility with the public when
they characterized the risk. Unfortu-
nately, government agencies too, are
often not a trusted information source.
Let us step back a moment and look
quickly at these outrage factors with an
environmental health controversy in mind
to see how they influence risk. Early in
1994 in the semirural, semisuburban town
of Corona, California, the U. S. Depart-
ment ofAgriculture and the California
Department of Food and Agriculture
began sending three helicopters to fly over
town at night in tandem every few weeks
for 6 months. The pilots released tiny bits
of malathion-containing insect bait
through the entire area in an effort to kill
the Mediterranean fruit flies that were sus-
pected to be there. Many residents had
horses and other livestock kept out in the
open and there were a small number of
farmers in the area. The agencies told local
officials and residents ofthe decision a few
days before the pesticide application was to
begin and warned them that there were no
alternatives. The agencies said the applica-
tion was needed to prevent infestation of
commercial fruit and vegetables, which
they believed would cause Japan to
embargo California produce.
With this situation in mind, we can
review the list ofoutrage factors and pre-
dict the nature and strength ofthe Corona
residents' response. At a public meeting
called by the agencies to explain their deci-
sion, an overflow crowd of hundreds of
angry residents were vociferous in their
opposition and scarcely allowed agency
representatives to speak. The city council
unanimously opposed the malathion appli-
cation and filed suit, unsuccessfully, in an
effort to stop it. This public reaction is
hardly surprising since the pesticide appli-
cation was not voluntary; residents were
not offered control over exposure to fami-
lies, pets, and livestock; benefits accrued to
agribusiness, and risks, if any, accrued to
the town's residents; the agencies were
viewed as having only the interests of
agribusiness in mind, and so as untrust-
worthy; and so on.
We can see that outrage factors can be
used well by scientists and policymakers to
foresee public concern and to take this
concern into account in describing and
addressing hazards. Imagine the credibility
Secretary O'Leary would have had if she
had said that the Department of Energy
assured the public that the radiation exper-
iments were all safe and proper and were
no cause ofconcern, and that for reasons of
national security she was unable to release
additional information. There would have
been a furor, a great division in the country
between those who supported that view
and those who did not. There would have
been cries ofcover-up, reports from every-
where that alleged illnesses from the experi-
ments, indignation over the seeming
preference for testing Blacks and children,
a crippling diversion ofresources and low-
ered morale inside the agencies in response
to the allegations, etc. In short, had she
defended the experiments, prevented access
to information, and taken no action, the
outrage level would have risen enormously.
Instead ofraising public outrage, how-
ever, Secretary O'Leary took it into
account; she stepped to the side ofthe pub-
lic, acknowledged and even "owned" the
outrage, and took assertive action. In
announcing the tests, she said, "We were
shrouded and clouded in an atmosphere of
secrecy. And I would take it a step further:
I would call it repression....[I was] appalled
and shocked [to learn of the tests] and it
just gave me an ache in my gut and my
heart" (6). She announced an effort to
review 32 million documents for declassifi-
cation and a thorough investigation of the
experiments. Taking a most unusual stance
for a Cabinet member, she placed herselfin
potential conflict with the Department of
Justice when she later said that the govern-
ment should compensate victims of the
tests. She noted that her department had a
history offighting claims filed by people
who lived downwind of nuclear weapons
tests in the 1950s and 1960s, and said, "It
doesn't occur to me that, that is the pos-
ture I want to be in....[We must ask,]
What does it take to make these people
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whole?" (7). She established a toll-free hot-
line to answer people's questions and to
take any information they might offer.
Secretary O'Leary thus tapped into the
productive energy inherent in the outrage
and helped use it as a cooperative force for
investigation and change, while turning a
potential trust disaster into an increase in
trust for her agency. She provides a good
example ofhow scientists and policy makers
can break down the barriers between the
two risk equations; scientists can learn about
and take to heart the full range ofrisk fac-
tors-not just hazard factors, but outrage
factors as well. This approach allows scien-
tists to bridge the risk perception gap
between themselves and the public and gives
reporters the opportunity to report on
something closer to concord than conflict.
Such an approach can onlyaid scientists and
the media in furthering fruitful dialogue on
environmental health hazards and on setting
appropriate research priorities.
REFERENCES
1. Consumer's Research Magazine. 76(10):31-33 (1993).
2. Sandman PM. Explaining Environmental Risk.
Washington:U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1986.
3. Sandman PM. Risk communication: facing public outrage.
EPAJ 13(9):21 (1987).
4. Tannen D. You Just Don't Understand. New York: Ballantine,
1990.
5. Harris S. [Cartoon]. Current Controvery 4(3):4 (1985).
6. Schneider K. New York Times, 8 December 1993;A20.
7. Schneider K. New YorkTimes, 29 December 1993;A1.
Volume 103, Supplement 6, September 1995 125